Five discrimination cases employers need to know about in April 2025.

Mrs Roofe-Stewart was diagnosed with a chronic condition in 2010. Her condition had become inactive since 2015, with no reported flare-ups and the stopping of her immuno-suppressant drugs.

In June 2021, she was dismissed by her employer for refusing to engage in certain COVID-19 testing procedures at work. She brought a claim for disability discrimination.

The tribunal ruled she was not disabled under the Equality Act 2010, as her condition no longer had a substantial adverse effect on her and was unlikely to recur. Mrs Roofe-Stewart appealed this decision.

The Employment Appeal Tribunal (EAT) found that the tribunal correctly concluded her condition was inactive but failed to consider whether it was likely to recur. The EAT emphasised the “likely to recur” test sets a low bar, only requiring that recurrence “could well happen.” The tribunal did not sufficiently consider if her chronic condition could flare up again and impact her daily activities. The case was sent back to the Employment Tribunal for reconsideration.

Mr Thomas was engaged to provide consultancy services for just under three months before his contract was terminated early by his employer because of an unspent criminal conviction.

Mr Thomas claimed that he was being discriminated against based on his political beliefs and affiliation with the English Democrat party. He argued that this constituted a protected belief under the Equality Act, and he had been discriminated against by the partnership.

The tribunal held that, while English nationalism may be considered a philosophical belief, the claimant’s anti-Islamic views, as expressed through his various social media posts, meant that he was not protected by discrimination laws. His anti-Islamic views were not worthy of respect in a democratic society and clearly conflicted with the fundamental rights of others. Mr Thomas appealed the decision.

The EAT dismissed the appeal and agreed with the tribunal’s conclusion that his belief in English nationalism was not protected under the Equality Act due to its extreme anti-Islamic nature.

This case highlights that beliefs promoting hatred and violence are not worthy of respect and so not protected under the Equality Act.

Ms Carozzi is a Brazilian national of Jewish ethnic origin. She was employed by the University of Hertfordshire as a Marketing, Engagement and Partnerships Manager. Her role involved talking to internal clients.

During her probationary period issues about Ms Carozzi’s performance arose and the university made comments about how her accent made it hard to understand her. Prior to the completion of her probation, which had been extended, Ms Carozzi resigned and brought tribunal claims, including claims for harassment related to race. She alleged that comments made about her accent amounted to racial harassment.

As a reminder, harassment occurs where conduct is related to a protected characteristic and either violates a person’s dignity or creates an intimidating, hostile, degrading, or offensive environment. The tribunal held that the comments about her accent were not race-related harassment because they were not motivated by race but rather her performance. The EAT overturned this decision on appeal.

The EAT outlined that conduct does not need to be explicitly motivated by a protected characteristic to constitute harassment under the Equality Act. They clarified that, unlike direct discrimination, discriminatory intent is not required for discriminatory harassment.

The EAT found that comments about the claimant’s accent could meet these criteria and sent the claim back to a new tribunal for reconsideration. It will still be up to the claimant to prove to that new tribunal that she was offended by the comments made by her manager around her accent and that it was reasonable for her to feel that way. If she can’t prove that, her claim will fail.

Ms Bailey was a criminal barrister at Garden Court Chambers. In 2018, Garden Court signed up to Stonewall’s ‘Diversity Champions’ scheme. Ms Bailey objected to the association with Stonewall because, while she fully supports trans rights, she did not wish to align herself with what she considered to be the “trans-extremism” advocated by Stonewall. She subsequently posted tweets expressing her opposition to related matters and, as a result, Stonewall made a complaint to Garden Court.

Garden Court investigated and asked Ms Bailey to delete the tweets. Ms Bailey brought claims against her Chambers, and she also brought a claim against Stonewell, alleging that they induced, instructed or caused, or attempted to induce or cause, the Chambers’ actions against her.

It is unlawful to ‘instruct’ someone else to do something in relation to another person that constitutes discrimination – in this case Ms Bailey believed Stonewall had done so. That person/body that instructs someone else to act unlawfully may be brought into proceedings as a Respondent, as Ms Bailey’s claim did.

The Tribunal found that Ms Bailey had been directly discriminated against by Garden Court because of her gender critical beliefs, which are protected under the Equality Act, but dismissed Ms Bailey’s claim against Stonewall. Ms Bailey appealed the decision. The EAT rejected the appeal and upheld the tribunal’s decision that Stonewall did not induce or cause Garden Court to discriminate against her.

The EAT found that “induce” is broadly synonymous with “persuade“, noting that “in one case it could consist of pure verbal persuasion and in another it could involve an element of carrot or stick“. The EAT held that Ms Bailey failed to show on the facts that Stonewall had intended to cause a detriment to her by making the complaint to Garden Court.

The EAT went on to find that although the Stonewall complaint was motivated by Ms Bailey’s protected beliefs, it was made as a protest only and not with any specific aim in mind apart from a public denial of association with her views. There was no element of threat made by Stonewall and it did not intend Garden Court to inflict any detriment on her because of her protected belief.

Mrs Higgs was employed by Farmor’s School as a pastoral administrator and work experience manager. Mrs Higgs is a Christian who holds gender critical beliefs and a lack of belief in gender fluidity. In 2018, Mrs Higgs shared some posts on her private Facebook page, which related to her own Christian beliefs, in particular, beliefs that related to same sex relationships and gender fluidity.

In one re-post she had written “Please read this! They are brainwashing our children” and encouraged people to sign a petition. The school received a third-party complaint about the social media post from a parent and, following an investigation, Mrs Higgs was dismissed for gross misconduct. While no concerns had been raised regarding her conduct within the school, she was found to have breached the code of conduct, on the basis that a parent had taken offence and there was risk of reputational damage.

Following her dismissal, Mrs Higgs brought a claim for direct religion or belief discrimination and harassment related to religion or belief, claiming that she had been dismissed because she had manifested her beliefs.

The tribunal dismissed the claims, holding that, although Mrs Higgs’ beliefs were protected under the Equality Act, her dismissal was because the “florid and provocative language” of her posts might “reasonably” lead people to conclude she was homophobic and transphobic (which was denied by Mrs Higgs). She appealed the decision. The EAT allowed her appeal and remitted the case back to the tribunal. It found that the tribunal had failed to engage with the question of whether the school’s actions were as a result of the manifestation of Mrs Higgs’ beliefs. Mrs Higgs objected to the EAT’s order for remittal and appealed to the Court of Appeal.

When the case reached the Court of Appeal, it upheld Mrs Higgs’ appeal, finding that her dismissal was not objectively justified and that it constituted unlawful discrimination. They considered that, even if the language in the posts passed the threshold of objectionability, it was not “grossly offensive”, there was no evidence that her views influenced her work at the school and there was no evidence that the reputation of the school had been damaged. In the circumstances her dismissal was not a proportionate response to her actions.

Because of this case, it is likely that employers will find it harder to take action against an employee for views expressed on their social media accounts. Employer’s must also avoid a zero-tolerance approach to this type of conduct. This case underscores the importance of careful, context-specific assessments in cases involving the manifestation of beliefs and a very clear and substantiated rationale backed up by facts as to how the actions of an employee justify disciplinary action. Without that justifiable rationale, any sanction is likely to be discriminatory.

Here are some of the key things to be aware of:

• Day one right – employees can benefit from NCL from day one of their employment;
• Applies to babies born on or after 6 April 2025;
• Care must start within the first 28 days of birth and continue for at least 7 continuous days;
• Employees will be entitled to one week of leave for each week of uninterrupted neonatal care (up to a maximum of 12 weeks);
• NCL may be taken in addition to other types of statutory family leave, but must be taken within 68 weeks of the baby’s birth;
• NCL must be taken to provide care for the baby, or where the baby sadly dies after NCL has been accrued;
• Statutory Neonatal Care Pay currently requires 26 weeks’ service and average earnings of at least £123 per week.